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COMMENT 
EXPERT TESTIMONY AND 
"SUBTLE DISCRIMINATION" 
IN THE WORKPLACE: 
DO WE NOW NEED A 
WEATHERMAN TO KNOW WHICH 
WAY THE WIND BLOWS? 
INTRODUCTION 
Elsayed Mukhtar v. California State University, Hayward 
is an employment discrimination action brought by a black pro-
fessor denied tenure at Cal State Hayward. 1 The case turns on 
the admission of the expert testimony of sociology professor Dr. 
David Wellman, a racial-discrimination expert who analyzed 
the disputed tenure decision according to eight criteria he had 
developed for "decoding" white behavior.2 Initially, the case 
resulted in a victory for the plaintiff, who was awarded 
$637,000 in damages after a nine-day jury triaV On appeal, 
however, the Ninth Circuit overturned the jury's verdict and 
remanded for a new trial on the grounds that the trial judge 
had failed to make the requisite reliability determination con-
1 Elsayed Mukhtar v. California State University, Hayward, 299 F.3d 1053 (9th 
Cir. 2002), amended, 319 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 2003). 
2 Elsayed 299 F.3d at 1062. For an account of Dr. Wellman's qualifications, see 
Appellee's Brief at 44-45, Elsayed Mukhtar v. California State University, Hayward, 
299 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2002), amended, 319 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 2003) (No. 01-15565). 
For a discussion of Dr. Wellman's decoding methodology, see infra notes 120-128 and 
accompanying text. 
3 Id. at 1061. 
37 
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cerning Dr. Wellman's testimony.4 This was not harmless er-
ror, held the court, as without Dr. Wellman's testimony, the 
case would reduce to "a mere difference of academic opinion" -
not a Title VII offense.5 
What is at stake here? From one point of view, a civil 
rights plaintiff has been perversely robbed of a jury verdict be-
cause of a procedural nicety: "[A] panel of this court overturned 
the jury's verdict because it believed that the district court had 
not made a procedurally proper Daubert ruling. '" In doing so, 
it acted in a manner contrary to all precedent ... "6 And yet, 
much recent discourse on employment discrimination jurispru-
dence starts from the observation that the mainstream Title 
VII cases invest heavily in procedure: "It is no secret that the 
Supreme Court's Title VII jurisprudence cloaks substance in 
the 'curious garb' of procedure. When the Supreme Court talks 
about employment discrimination under Title VII, it generally 
does so by creating and refining special proof structures - dif-
ferent methods of proving discrimination."7 In a general way, 
this intense focus on procedure is understood to have come 
about because discrimination is hard to prove - and never more 
so than in the contemporary workplace, where it has become 
subtle and covert, perhaps even largely unconscious: 
AB traditional social norms permitting overt racism and seg-
regation give way to a modern norm of egalitarianism, and as 
well-defined, hierarchical, bureaucratic structures delineating 
clear paths for advancement within institutions give way to a 
globalized workplace of flexible governance and movement be-
tween institutions, discrimination often operates in the work-
place today less as a blanket policy or discrete, identifiable 
decision to exclude than as a perpetual tug on opportunity 
and advancement. ... It creeps into everyday impressions of 
worth and assignment of merit on the job, lurking constantly 
, [d. at 1068. For a discussion of the reliability determination requirement as 
established by the Daubert v. Merrell Dow line of cases, see infra notes 24-53 and ac-
companying text. 
5 [d. at 1067-68. 
6 Elsayed, amended, 319 F.3d at 1075 (Rheinhardt, J., dissenting from denial of 
rehearing en bane). Eleven of the Ninth Circuit judges joined in this dissent. [d. 
Thirteen votes were required for a rehearing. [d. at 1078. 
7 Deborah Malamud, The Last Minuet: Disparate Treatment after Hicks, 93 
MICH. L. REV. 2229, 2229-2231 (1995). 
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behind even the most honest belief in equality, perpetuating 
the very injustice that we decry.B 
39 
In the academic literature, such a characterization of sub-
tle discrimination is likely to be reinforced by a proffer of social 
science research. Thus, in a way, Elsayed seems like an inevi-
table moment in the trajectory of Title VII discrimination ju-
risprudence - like a plot point on a graph. Data indicate, ar-
gued Elsayed, "that while there is an increasing trend toward 
verbal tolerance in relation to issues of race and racism, there 
is a discrepancy between such statements and the routine eve-
ryday practices of white Americans. "9 Thus Dr. Wellman's 
"specialized sociological knowledge" was helpful to the jury, 
assisting them "to identify and to analyze coded expressions of 
contemporary racism."IO 
Legal scholar Michael Selmi points out that "a finding of 
discrimination is ultimately a factual determination ... that 
requires drawing an inference of discrimination based on cir-
cumstantial evidence."ll The Supreme Court crafted the spe-
cial Title VII proof structures to facilitate the drawing of this 
inference. 12 Yet, according to Selmi, "despite its rhetoric re-
garding the importance of ferreting out subtle discrimination, 
the Court has only seen discrimination in the most overt or ob-
vious situations - situations that could not be explained on any 
basis other than race. "13 If the Court has failed to see subtle 
discrimination despite its Title VII proof regime, legal scholar-
• Tristin K Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics: Toward a Structural 
Account of Disparate Treatment Theory, 38 MARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 91 (2003). 
9 Elsayed, 299 F.3d at 1066 n.9. 
I°Id. 
11 Michael Selmi, Proving Intentional Discrimination: The Reality of Supreme 
Court Rhetoric, 86 GEO. L.J. 279, 283 (1997). Michael Selmi, Professor of Law at 
George Washington University School of Law, has made a significant contribution to 
discrimination discourse. See, e.g., Response to Professor Wax: Discrimination as Acci-
dent: Old Whine, New Bottle, 74 IND. L.J. 1233 (1999) and Testing for Equality: Merit, 
Efficiency, and the Affirmative Action Debate, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1251 (1995), in addi-
tion to the two articles on which this Comment relies. See Seimi, infra note 14. This 
Comment is heavily indebted to Professor Selmi's writings. 
12 Selmi, supra note 11, at 283. The proof reginIe for individual intentional 
employment discrimination cases under Title VII was established in McDonnell Doug-
las Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See infra notes 57-95 and accompanying text. 
13 Selmi, supra note 11, at 284. 
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ship has not.14 The problem of subtle discrimination has gener-
ated a complex and nuanced discourse among legal scholars 
and academics in the social sciences.ls Elsayed represents an 
experiment in bringing this discourse into the courtroom to 
educate judge and jury. 
When subtle discrimination discourse comes to court, 
though, another significant proof regime, the Daubert expert 
testimony jurisprudence, comes into play. IS Under Daubert, 
trial judges must operate as gatekeepers, assuring that no ex-
pert testimony reaches the jury unless shown to be both rele-
vant and reliable. l7 Can the academic subtle discrimination 
discourse pass muster under the Daubert regime? If it can, will 
civil rights plaintiffs ultimately benefit from the admission of 
subtle discrimination testimony by academics? .. 
This Comment studies Elsayed in order to investigate 
these questions. The Background discussion traces the two 
great lines of cases whose trajectories cross in Elsayed, the 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow expert testimony jurisprudence under 
the Federal Rules of Evidence and the McDonnell Douglas v. 
Green line of cases establishing the "pretext" model of proof for 
individual employment discrimination claims under Title VII of 
the 1964 Civil Rights ActY Then, turning to the opinion 
proper, the Analysis considers Elsayed under the following 
headings: (A) The Crux: The Court's Harmless-Error Determi-
nation,l9 (B) Decoding in the Pretext Context,2o (C) Substituting 
the Mixed-Motives Regime under Costa for the Pretext Regime 
under Reeves,21 (D) The Rehabilitation of Circumstantial Evi-
dence in Desert Palace. 22 
1. See Michael Selmi, Subtle Discrimination: A Matter of Perspective Rather Than 
Intent, 34 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L.R. 657, 659 (2003) (exploring the perspective gap be-
tween scholars and the courts). 
1. Id. 
16 Elsayed, 299 F.3d at 1063. 
17 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 579-80 (1993); 
Kumho Tire v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137,138 (1999). 
18 See infra notes 24-98 and accompanying text. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Phar-
maceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993); Fed. R. Evid. 702 (2000); McDonnell Douglas 
Corp. v. Green, 414 U.S. 792 (1973); 42 USC § 2000e-2(a) (2000). 
19 See infra notes 99-119 and accompanying text. 
20 See infra notes 120-173 and accompanying text. 
21 See infra notes 174-198 and accompanying text. 
22 See infra notes 199-202 and accompanying text. 
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Finally, based on this analysis, the Conclusion articulates 
a qualified endorsement of the thirty-year-old McDonnell Doug-
las "pretext" proof regime for individual employment discrimi-
nation cases.23 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. THE DAUBERT v. MERRELL Dow LINE OF CASES 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., decided in 
1993, made federal judges gatekeepers with respect to expert 
testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 702.24 Before 
Daubert, the reigning standard since 1923 had been the Frye 
"general acceptance" test, predicating the admissibility of ex-
pert testimony on its acceptance in the relevant scientific com-
munity.25 The 1973 adoption of Rule 702, however, cast some 
doubt on the continuing validity of Frye. 26 The new Rule gov-
erning expert testimony did not incorporate the venerable 
"general acceptance" language of Frye, simply providing that "If 
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist 
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a 
fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, 
skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in 
the form of an opinion or otherwise. "27 To resolve the doubt 
that grew up around the unclear relationship between Frye and 
Rule 702, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Daubert in 
1992.28 
23 But see Malamud, supra note 7, at 2229, 2230-231. "The liberal legal commu-
nity has sought - and claims to have found - a set of substantive judgments embedded 
in the Court's procedural decisions. What is said to exist is a substantive consensus 
that the eradication of discrimination is a high societal priority, and that discrimina-
tion is pervasive but difficult to prove .... When the Court's procedural decisions take a 
conservative, pro-defendant turn, critics decry the departure from this substantive 
consensus. These critiques nostalgically seek a return to what they deem the correct, 
liberal past in which a deep societal commitment to the eradication of discrimination 
shaped a plaintiff-friendly procedural jurisprudence." [d . 
.. See Gordon Beggs, Novel Expert Evidence in Federal Civil Rights Litigation, 45 
AM. U.L. REv. 1, 31-33 (1995); John Jansonius and Andrew Gould, Expert Witnesses in 
Employment Litigation: The Role of Reliability in Assessing Admissibility, 50 BAYLOR 
L. REv. 267, 277 (1998). 
25 Frye v. U.S., 293 F. 1013 (1923). 
26 Jansonius and Gould, supra note 24, at 274-275. 
27 Fed. R. Evid. 702. 
28 Jansonius and Gould, supra note 24, at 275. 
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In Daubert, a products liability case, the minor plaintiffs 
claimed the anti-nausea drug Bendectin, used by their mothers 
during pregnancy, had caused their birth defects.29 The plain-
tiffs offered the testimony of eight well-qualified experts to es-
tablish that Bendectin caused their injuries, but the trial court 
awarded summary judgment to the defendants.30 The Ninth 
Circuit affirmed, ruling the plaintiffs' expert testimony inad-
missible under Frye.3l The Supreme Court, however, vacated 
the summary judgment order and remanded the case, holding 
that Frye's "general acceptance" test had been superseded by 
the adoption of Rule 702.32 "[T]he trial judge must ensure," said 
the Daubert court, "that any and all scientific testimony or evi-
dence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable. "33 The Court 
went on to formulate four general considerations to guide trial 
judges in their newly conceived gatekeeping role: 1) whether 
the expert's analysis derives from a scientific method that can 
be or has been tested, 2) whether the expert's method has been 
the subject of peer review and testing, 3) the actual or potential 
rate of error in the expert's methodology, and 4) whether the 
relevant scientific community generally accepts the expert's 
methodology.34 Thus, "general acceptance," the sine qua non 
under Frye, has dwindled to just one of four factors in a nonex-
haustive list.35 
The expert testimony at issue in Daubert concerned scien-
tific knowledge. The language of Rule 702, however, is more 
inclusive, encompassing "scientific, technical, or other special-
ized knowledge."36 Six years after the Daubert decision, the Su-
preme Court granted certiorari in another products liability 
case, Kumho Tire v. Carmichael, to resolve uncertainty among 
the lower courts as to whether or how Daubert applied to non-
scientific expert testimony.37 
29 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 579. 
30 Daubert, 727 F.Supp. 570, 576 (S.D. Cal. 989). See Jansonius and Gould, supra 
note 24, at 276. 
31 Daubert, 951 F.2d 1128, 1131 (9'" Cir.). 
32 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 587, 598. 
33 Id. at 589. 
34 Id. at 593.594. 
35 Id. at 593. "Many factors will bear on the inquiry, and we do not presume to 
set out a definitive checklist or test." Id. 
36 Fed. R. Evid. 702. 
37 Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichae~ 526 U.S. 137, 147 (1999). 
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The Kumho plaintiffs, injured in an automobile accident 
when a tire blew out, offered the expert testimony of a tire-
failure analyst in support of their claim against the tire manu-
facturer.38 The tire analyst used his own method of visual and 
tactile inspection, inferring a manufacturing or design defect in 
the absence of at least two of a set list of tire abuse symptoms 
he had developed.39 The trial court found this testimony inad-
missible under the four-factor Daubert test.40 On reconsidera-
tion, the trial court acknowledged that it initially applied 
Daubert too mechanically; nevertheless, even under a flexible 
application of the Daubert reliability test, the expert's method-
ology did not pass muster.41 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit 
reversed, remanding for non -Daubert proceedings after holding 
that Daubert did not apply at all outside the realm of scientific 
testimony.42 
Addressing the confusion about Daubert's scope, the Su-
preme Court made clear that the trial judge's gatekeeping obli-
gation under Daubert applies not only to testimony based on 
"scientific" knowledge but also to testimony based on "techni-
cal" and "other specialized" knowledge.43 Further, the gate-
keeping function is to be performed flexibly.44 The Daubert fac-
tors are not exhaustive or definitive, and trial judges have lee-
way to determine not only whether expert testimony is reliable, 
but also how to make the reliability determination.45 While 
trial judges enjoy broad discretion in the conduct of reliability 
inquiries after Kumho, however, they do not have discretion to 
abandon the obligation to conduct them. Justice Scalia under-
scored this in a separate concurrence in Kumho: "I join the 
opinion of the Court, which makes clear that the discretion it 
endorses - trial court discretion in choosing the manner of test-
ing expert reliability - is not discretion to abandon the gate-
keeping function."46 
38 Kumlw, 526 u.s. at 142. 
39 [d. at 144, 153-154. 
'" [d. at 145. For four-factor test, see supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
41 [d. at 145-146. 
42 [d. at 146. 
43 [d. at 141. "The initial question before us is whether this basic gatekeeping 
obligation applies only to scientific testimony or to all expert testimony. We, like the 
parties, believe that it applies to all expert testimony." [d. at 146. 
« [d. at 138 . 
.. [d. at 152-153 . 
.. [d. at 158-159 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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A trio of recent court of appeals decisions delineate the 
trial courts' post-Kumho obligation to make reliability determi-
nations when expert testimony is proffered. In United States v. 
Velarde, a child sexual abuse case, the Tenth Circuit reversed 
and remanded where the trial judge had failed to conduct any 
kind of reliability determination on the record before admitting 
the testimony of a pediatrician and a child psychologist who 
had treated the victim.47 "Well, I'm not going to hold a Daubert 
hearing," said the judge.48 "I've had this testimony before in 
trials, and it's not new and novel."49 Distinguishing Velarde, 
the Ninth Circuit affirmed the trial court in U.S. v. Alatorre, 
noting that while the court had denied the defendant's request 
for a Daubert hearing prior to trial, it did permit the defendant 
to conduct a lengthy voir dire of the government's drug-crimes 
expert during the trial, ultimately ruling on the relevance and 
reliability of the government witness's testimony.5o And in U.S. 
v. Hankey, the trial court conducted an extensive voir dire of 
the government's police gang expert to assess the relevance 
and reliability of his testimony, which was sufficient for the 
Ninth Circuit to affirm.51 Though some sort of reliability de-
termination is clearly required by Daubert jurisprudence, the 
circuits are currently split on whether a failure to create a re-
cord of the reliability determination is an abuse of discretion.52 
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence in 2000 in-
corporated the holdings of Daubert and Kumho.53 As amended, 
Rule 702 reads, "If scientific, technical, or other specialized 
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evi-
dence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an 
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, 
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) 
the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the tes-
timony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and 
(3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably 
to the facts of the case." By spelling out the elements of a 
"United States v. Velarde, 214 F.3d 1204, 120S (2000) . 
.. [d. at 120S 
.9 [d. 
00 United States v. Alatorre, 222 F.3d 109S, 1104-1105 (2000) . 
.. United States v. Hankey, 203 F.3d 1160, 116S-1169 (2000). 
52 See Reliable Evaluation of Expert Testimony, 116 HARv. L. REv. 2142, 2161 
n.S9 (2003). 
63 [d. at 2144. 
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proper Daubert inquiry - from data to principles and methods 
to application - the Rule mandates activist gatekeepers, mak-
ing it clear that no expert testimony, however seemingly famil-
iar or arcane, will be permitted to pass by cloaking itself in the 
outward signs of expertise. 
B. THE McDONNELL DOUGLAS v. GREEN LINE OF CASES 
Though trial court judges must inquire into the relevance 
and reliability of expert testimony under Daubert, they have 
discretion concerning the manner of the inquiry.54 Clearly, the 
Daubert inquiry will be shaped by context, the particular type 
of case being tried. 55 In individual employment discrimination 
cases under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, this shaping 
context will be supplied by the McDonnell Douglas v. Green 
line of cases, a jurisprudence already preoccupied with the 
question of what constitutes reliable proof.56 
1. Pretext Analysis, McDonnell Douglas through Reeves 
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act makes it an unlawful 
employment practice "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge 
any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any indi-
vidual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or 
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin. "57 In the seminal 
McDonnell Douglas v. Green case, one of the first employment 
discrimination cases to be decided under Title VII, the Su-
preme Court set forth a framework for proving intentional em-
ployment discrimination that remains vital today.58 Though 
the proof structure established in this case has generally been 
considered plaintiff-friendly in concept, in practice many seem-
ingly deserving plaintiffs have been denied relief under the 
54 Kumho, 526 U.S. at 158-159. 
55 See, e.g., Kumho, 526 U.S. at 139 (reviewing trial court's assessment of tire-
failure analyst's testimony proffered in products liability case). 
56 See Malamud, supra note 7, at 2229-2230. 
57 Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a) (2000). 
58 St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506 (1993). See Selmi, supra 
note 14, at 666 (assessing the model's continuing viability). 
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McDonnell Douglas regime, an irony that has not gone unno-
ticed in the Title VII discourse. 59 
In McDonnell Douglas, Percy Green, a civil-rights activist 
and radio mechanic, was laid off from his job at the McDonnell-
Douglas plant in St. Louis Missouri in 1964.60 When the com-
pany rejected Green the following summer for an open me-
chanic's job for which he was clearly qualified, he filed an ad-
ministrative action before the newly formed Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), alleging racial dis-
crimination as well as retaliation for his civil rights activities.61 
In due course, his discrimination claim came before the Su-
preme Court, only the second case the Court had certified un-
der Title VII.62 
Declaring that Title VII "tolerates no racial discrimination, 
subtle or otherwise," the Court identified the critical issue be-
fore it as concerning the order and allocation of proof.63 Under 
Title VII, a plaintiff alleging racial discrimination in the work-
place must first establish a prima facie case, showing that he 
belongs to a racial minority, that he applied and was qualified 
for the position in question, that he was rejected despite his 
qualifications, and that after his rejection the job stayed open 
and the employer continued to seek applicants from among 
similarly qualified individuals.64 Once the plaintiff has estab-
lished his prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to 
articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the 
challenged action.65 If the employer is able to make this show-
ing, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the ar-
ticulated reason is a pretext.66 Here, the Court found that 
Green had made out his prima facie case, and that the com-
59 See, e.g., Malamud, supra note 7, at 2229; Selmi, supra note 11, at 324 . 
.., McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 794. See David B. Oppenheimer, 
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green Revisited: Why Non-Violent Civil Disobedience 
Should Be Protected from Retaliation by Title VII, 34 COLUM. HUM. RTS. LR 635, 636-
645 (2003) (placing this foundational case in historical context). 
61 McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 796. The EEOC administers and en-
forces Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Americans with Disabilities Act 
of 1990.29 C.F.R. §§ 1600-169l. 
62 Oppenheimer, supra note 60, at 64l. 
63 McDonnell Douglas Corp. 411 U.S. at 801,800. 
54 Id. at 802. The Court acknowledges that differing factual situations will re-
quire some variation in the prima facie proof as specified here. Id. at 802 n.13. 
65 Id . 
.. Id. at 804. 
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pany met its rebuttal burden with its claim that it refused to 
hire Green solely because of his unlawful conduct against it.67 
On remand, then, Green was to be "afforded a fair opportunity" 
to show that the company's stated reason was in fact pretext.68 
If the employee can expose the employer's articulated rea-
son as pretext, what then? In St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 
a series of disciplinary actions against Melvin Hicks, the only 
African American among six shift commanders at a correc-
tional institution, culminated in his discharge after a heated 
exchange with his boss.69 Hicks easily established his prima 
facie case under McDonnell Douglas: as an Mrican American, 
he was a member of a protected class; he was qualified for his 
position, as he had recently been promoted; and he was subject 
to an adverse employment action in that he was demoted and 
then discharged while the position remained open.70 The bur-
den shifted, then, to St. Mary's to articulate a legitimate reason 
for Hick's termination.71 St. Mary's cited the frequency and 
severity of Hicks' offenses.72 By producing evidence that simi-
lar and even more serious violations by his co-workers were 
treated more leniently, Hicks made a classic showing of pre-
text.73 Under some earlier Title VII decisions, this would have 
been enough to establish unlawful employment discrimina-
tion.74 The Hicks court, however, ruled that a rmding of pretext 
permits but does not compel the inference of intentional dis-
crimination, leaving open the ultimate question of discrimina-
tion.75 
In Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, an age dis-
crimination case, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to cor-
rect an overly restrictive reading of Hicks, resolving a conflict 
67 [d. at 802, 803. Note that "unlawful conduct" here signifies nonviolent civil 
rights demonstrations that Mr. Green participated in. [d. at 803-804. 
58 [d. at 804. 
69 St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 504-505 (1993). See Seimi, 
supra note 11, at 328-334 (placing Hicks in the disparate treatment employment dis-
crimination jurisprudence). 
70 Selmi, supra note 11, at 329. 
71 Hicks, 509 U.S. at 507; Selmi, supra note 11, at 329. 
72 Hicks, 509 U.S. at 507; Selmi, supra note 11, at 329. 
73 Hicks, 509 U.S. at 508; Seimi, supra note 11, at 329. 
" Selmi, supra note 11, at 330. 
,. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511. 
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among the circuits. 76 The question before the Court in Reeves 
was whether a finding of liability for intentional discrimination 
can be sustained by a plaintiffs prima facie case of discrimina-
tion combined with sufficient evidence for a reasonable fact-
finder to reject the employer's nondiscriminatory explanation 
for its decision. 77 Shoddy recordkeeping was the legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason the employer articulated for firing 
Reeves.78 Though Reeves was able to establish that this reason 
was pretext, the Fifth Circuit overturned the lower court's 
damages award, explaining that establishing pretext did not 
dispose of the ultimate issue of discrimination, as the plaintiff 
had further to establish that his age actually motivated the 
adverse employment action.79 
The Supreme Court disagreed: "Proof that the defendant's 
explanation is unworthy of credence is simply one form of cir-
cumstantial evidence that is probative of intentional discrimi-
nation, and it may be quite persuasive .... Moreover, once the 
employer's justification has been eliminated, discrimination 
may well be the most likely alternative explanation, especially 
since the employer is in the best position to put forth the actual 
reason for its decision."80 In Reeves, the Court seems to have 
gone some distance in rehabilitating two propositions identified 
by Michael Selmi as crucial to the vitality of the McDonell 
Douglas regime: "that employers are generally able to offer ex-
planations for their actions ... and that when employers are 
unable to provide a convincing explanation for their actions, a 
court may infer that the true reason was discrimination."81 
Most individual employment discrimination plaintiffs rely 
on circumstantial evidence and the pretext analysis developed 
under McDonnell Douglas.82 Since 1989, however, plaintiffs 
offering direct evidence of discrimination have been able to 
avail themselves of an alternative to the pretext analysis, argu-
76 Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, 530 U.S. 133, 140, 146-147 (2000). 
Though age is not one of the protected classifications under Title VII, the Court explic-
itly applies the McDonnell Douglas framework. [d. at 142. 
77 Reeves, 530 U.S. at 139, 146-147. 
78 [d. at 138. 
79 [d. at 146. 
80 [d. at 147. 
81 Selmi, supra note 11, at 325-326. 
82 [d. at 283. 
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ing "mixed motives" under Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins. 83 And 
since the 2003 Desert Palace v. Costa decision, direct evidence 
is no longer required to argue mixed motives.84 
2. The Mixed-Motive Cases, Price Waterhouse through Desert 
Palace 
A fascinating offshoot of the McDonnell Douglas line of 
cases, the "mixed-motive" branch, has produced especially con-
fusing and complex rulings. Instead of arguing that the em-
ployer's justification for an adverse employment action is pre-
textual, a mixed-motives plaintiff argues that the adverse ac-
tion was partly motivated by an illegal criterion.85 In Price 
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, the seminal mixed-motive case, the 
Court considered whether an adverse employment action was 
taken "because of' sex where both legitimate and illegitimate 
reasons played a part in the decision.86 The Court concluded 
that the employer could avoid liability by proving that it would 
have come to the same decision even if it had not allowed gen-
der to playa role, but the Justices were badly divided over the 
question of when the burden shifts to the employer to establish 
this affirmative defense.87 
In 1991, two years after the Price Waterhouse ruling, Con-
gress amended the 1964 Civil Rights Act, setting forth stan-
dards for mixed-motive cases.88 Under the 1991 amendments, 
an employee establishes an unlawful employment practice by 
demonstrating that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin 
was a motivating factor, even though other factors also moti-
vated the practice.89 The employer has a limited affirmative 
83 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) . 
.. Desert Palace v. Costa, Inc., 539 U.S. 90 (2003). 
85 See Christopher Chen, Rethinking the Direct Evidence Requirement: A Sug-
gested Approach in Analyzing Mixed-Motive Discrimination Claims, 86 CORNELL L. 
REV. 899 (2001). "In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, the United States Supreme Court 
augmented the existing framework for establishing employer liability in disparate 
treatment discrimination claims. This decision recognized the shortcomings of pretext 
analysis as outlined in McDonnell Douglas v. Green and Texas Department of Commu-
nity Affairs v. Burdine, and enunciated mixed-motives analysis which enables plaintiffs 
to hold employers liable whenever an illegitimate criterion, such as race, sex, or na-
tional origin, is a motivating factor in an adverse employment decision." [d . 
.. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 239-240. 
87 [d. at 244. Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 90. 
88 Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 91. 
88 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m). 
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defense under the new provisions, restricting remedies but not 
removing liability, if it can show that it would have taken the 
same action in the absence of the impermissible motivation.90 
The 1991 amendments to Title VII did not entirely 
straighten out the mixed-motive jurisprudence descended from 
Price Waterhouse. Relying on Justice O'Connor's concurring 
opinion in Price Waterhouse, a number of circuits have held 
that direct evidence of discrimination is required to establish 
liability under the 1991 provisions.91 In a sex discrimination 
case arising in the Ninth Circuit in 2002, however, the Su-
preme Court provided much-needed clarity and simplification.92 
Agreeing with the appeals court that the enactment of the 1991 
amendments abrogated Justice O'Connor's Price Waterhouse 
references to direct evidence, the Court in Desert Palace v. 
Costa turned to the language of the statute itself.93 Finding no 
requirement in the statute for a heightened showing in mixed-
motive employment discrimination cases, the Court held that 
in order to obtain a jury instruction under the 1991 provisions, 
the plaintiff need only present sufficient evidence for a reason-
able jury to conclude, by preponderance of the evidence, that 
"race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating 
factor for any employment practice. "94 The Court went beyond 
the immediate holding in Desert Palace to rehabilitate circum-
stantial evidence in general in Title VII cases: ''We have often 
acknowledged the utility of circumstantial evidence in dis-
crimination cases. ... The reason for treating circumstantial 
evidence and direct evidence alike is both clear and deep-rooted 
"95 
In sum, both the Daubert expert testimony line of cases 
and the McDonnell Douglas employment discrimination line of 
cases are actively evolving, with significant decisions emerging 
in each line within the last few years. Kumho Tire v. Carmi-
chael was decided in 1999, and the circuits are currently split 
00 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). 
9' Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 276; Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 91. 
92 Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 90. "The question before us in this case is whether a 
plaintiff must present direct evidence of discrimination in order to obtain a mixed-
motive instruction under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as amended by the 
Civil Rights Act of 1991 (1991 Act). We hold that direct evidence is not required." Id. 
93 Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 93-94 . 
.. Id. at 95-96 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)) . 
.. Id. at 94. 
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concerning the implications of its reliability determination re-
quirement.96 Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing, revitalizing the 
McDonnell Douglas pretext analysis, was decided in 2000, the 
same year the Kumho holding was incorporated by amendment 
into Evidence Rule 702.97 The Desert Palace ruling came down 
just last year, opening the way for mixed-motives cases based 
on circumstantial evidence.98 This complex and shifting back-
ground is largely what makes Elsayed Mukhtar v. California 
State University, Hayward worth examining. 
II. ANALYSIS 
As a matter of legal precedent, Elsayed Mukhtar v. Cali-
fornia State University, Hayward is not a significant case. It 
can be cited only for the relatively narrow proposition that the 
trial court commits reversible error when it admits expert tes-
timony without making a Daubert reliability determination on 
the record.99 Nevertheless, situated as it is at the juncture of 
two active fault lines of cases, the Elsayed opinion provides a 
good site for analysis, yielding rich material for critical specu-
lation. The question most immediately presented is whether 
the academic "subtle discrimination" discourse has a future in 
the courtroom. 
A. THE CRUX: THE COURT'S HARMLESS-ERROR DE-
TERMINATION 
Daubert doctrine requires the trial judge, as gatekeeper 
under the Federal Rules of Evidence, to ensure that all expert 
testimony admitted is not only relevant but reliable. lOo The 
gatekeeping inquiry is a flexible one and must be tied to the 
96 See Reliable Evaluation of Expert Testimony, 116 HARv. L. REV. 2142, 2144-
2147 (2003). 
97 Reeves, 530 U.S. at 133; Fed. R. Evid. 702. See supra notes 76-81 and accom-
panying text (discussing Reeves' place in Title VII individual employment discrimina-
tion jurisprudence). 
98 Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 90. See supra notes 91-95 and accompanying text 
(placing Desert Palace in Title VII individual employment discrimination jurispru-
dence); infra notes 174-198 and accompanying text (discussing substitution of Desert 
Palace for Reeves as Elsayed's McDonnell Douglas authority). 
99 Elsayed, 299 F.3d at 1068. "[T]he district court's erroneous admission of Dr. 
Wellman's testimony without the proper reliability determination was not harmless, 
and CSUH is entitled to a new trial." [d. 
100 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589; Kumho, 526 U.S. at 147. 
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facts of the particular case.lOl Though the trial court has a 
great deal of latitude in deciding how to conduct the gatekeep-
ing inquiry, it does not have the latitude to abandon the obliga-
tion altogether.102 In Elsayed, the trial court evinced awareness 
of its Daubert obligations, ordering both parties to produce 
Daubert briefs before ruling on the defendants' motion to ex-
clude Dr. Wellman's testimony.103 Before admitting the testi-
mony, the court reviewed two briefs by the defendants and 
three briefs by the plaintiff, as well as two declarations from 
Dr. Wellman, excerpts from Wellman's deposition, his prelimi-
nary report, and his curriculum vitae.1M Nevertheless, the 
Ninth Circuit found the trial court had abdicated its gatekeep-
ing role because it failed to make a reliability determination on 
the record before admitting Wellman's testimony.l05 "[T]he only 
indication we have that the district court found Dr. Wellman's 
testimony reliable is the fact that it was admitted over CSUH's 
reliability objections. Surely Daubert and its progeny require 
more. "106 
The circuits are currently split as to whether the failure to 
make a record of the reliability finding constitutes an abuse of 
discretion. 107 Here, the court cited two other Ninth Circuit 
cases in which expert testimony was admitted only after exten-
sive voir dire of the witness, as well as a Tenth Circuit case 
where the district court was overturned for failing to make any 
sort of reliability determination. lOS Thus far, the court seems to 
be on relatively solid ground. Requiring a formal reliability 
finding of some kind seems in keeping with Kumho, which em-
phasizes the flexibility of the Daubert inquiry but also reaf-
firms the importance of the gatekeeping function. l09 
101 Kumho, 526 U.S. at 150. 
102 [d. at 152, 158-159. 
103 Elsayed, 299 F.3d at 1064. 
104 [d. at 1064. 
105 [d. at 1066. 
106 [d. 
107 See Reliable Evaluation of Expert Testimony, 116 HARv. L. REV. 2142, 2161 
n.89 (2003). 
108 Elsayed, 299 F.3d at 1066. 
109 Kumho, 526 U.S. at 152. 
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A trial court's failure to make a reliability determination is 
reversible error, however, only if it is not harmless - that is, if 
it is more probably than not the cause of the outcome.110 Here, 
the court held the error was not harmless: 
Dr. Wellman drew the inference of discrimination for the jury 
in a case otherwise based entirely on less-than-convincing cir-
cumstantial evidence. Thus it is hard for us to see how Dr. 
Wellman's testimony, which addressed the central issue ofEI-
sayed's case, was harmless; rather it "more probably than not 
was the cause of the result reached."lll 
This is a surprising statement. Not only did the Elsayed 
jury find unlawful employment discrimination in the Univer-
sity's tenure denial, they also awarded punitive damages.1l2 To 
award punitive damages, the jury had to attribute conscious 
discrimination to the decision makers in Elsayed's tenure 
case.1l3 This was not an inference drawn for the jury by Dr. 
Wellman, whose testimony centered on "subtle discrimination" 
- that is to say, largely unconscious discriminationY4 Thus, 
the court's sweeping dismissal of all the other evidence in the 
case as less-than-convincing circumstantial evidence, llS indicat-
ing at most a mere difference of academic opinion, llS seems un-
warranted. 
What is more, insofar as Dr. Wellman did draw the infer-
ence of discrimination for the jury, he drew this inference from 
the same set of facts that was before the jury, evidence the 
Ninth Circuit characterizes as "less-than-convincing circum-
stantial evidence."117 It is hard to see how a convincing infer-
ence can be drawn from unconvincing evidence. Though the 
court claims not to express an opinion on the merits of 
110 Elsayed, 299 F.3d at 1066. 
111 Id. at 1068 (quoting Jauregi v. City of Glendale, 852 F.2d 1128, 1133 (1988». 
112 Id. at 1061. 
113 Id at 1068 n.15. 
114 See Appellee's Brief at 44-45, Elsayed Mukhtar v. California State University, 
Hayward, 299 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2002), amended, 319 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 2003) (No. 01-
15565). "The university portrayed Dr. Rees as an advocate of diversity. Dr. Wellman's 
decades of research decoding subtle racism assisted the jury in understanding that you 
do not have to be a bigot to make an employment decision on such impermissible fac-
tors as race and religion." Id. 
115 Elsayed, 299 F.3d at 1068. 
116Id. at 1067. 
117 Id. at 1068. 
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Wellman's testimony or on its reliability,US it is not hard to in-
fer one from this statement. The error is harmful only on the 
premise that Dr. Wellman's testimony is actually inadmissible; 
otherwise the substantial rights of the parties are unaffected 
by the trial court's error. U9 Implicitly, the court here decided 
on the admissibility of Dr. Wellman's testimony under cover of 
ruling on the mere formality of the trial court's failure to make 
a proper record. Thus, in order to predict how Dr. Wellman's 
testimony will fare on retrial and, more generally, how subtle 
discrimination testimony will fare in Title VII employment dis-
crimination cases under the Daubert expert testimony re-
quirements, we must ferret out and make explicit what the 
court states only indirectly. 
B. DECODING IN THE PRETEXT CONTEXT 
1. The Decoding Methodology: Dr. Wellman's Testimony 
On direct examination at trial, Dr. Wellman summarized 
his qualifications, described his assignment and the materials 
he reviewed for the case, explained the criteria he developed 
through his research to detect the presence of racial factors in 
decision-making, and applied the criteria to the facts of the 
case.120 Dr. Wellman explained that he systematically investi-
gates the racial worldview of Americans, conducting a type of 
qualitative research related to anthropological-ethnographic 
methods.121 The results of such research are not quantifiable, 
he explained, as the method focuses on the actor's understand-
ing of the world and attempts to get inside people's thinking.122 
Relying on in-depth interviews, focus groups, ethriographic ob-
liB [d. at 1068 n.12 
119 The dissent from the court's denial of an en banc hearing argues that the ma-
jority has misapplied the harmless error rule: "The district court's 'error' could have 
affected the verdict in a way that was prejudicial to the State University only if the 
testimony the jury heard could not have been admitted by means of a proper proce-
dural ruling. In the absence of a determination that the expert testimony did not qual-
ify for admission under Daubert, its admission cannot be deemed to have constituted 
'harmful' error or to have affected the substantial rights of the parties." Elsayed, 
amended, 319 F.3d at 1076 (emphasis in original). 
120 Appellee's Brief at 55, Elsayed Mukhtar v. California State University, Hay-
ward, 299 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2002), amended, 319 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 2003) (No. 01-
15565). 
121 [d. at 46. 
122 [d. 
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servation, and institutional document review, the methodology 
can be tested for validity, reliability and reproducibility.123 
In the course of his research, Dr. Wellman developed eight 
criteria, or "alarm bells," for detecting the presence of race as a 
hidden factor in decision making. 124 Dr. Wellman explained 
that he uses these criteria in the classroom to help his sociology 
students see the discrepancies between stated principles and 
everyday practices when it comes to race.125 He also uses them 
regularly in lectures, finding them "effective in helping Ameri-
cans understand practices that otherwise would go unno-
ticed."126 Applying his criteria to the facts of the Elsayed case, 
Dr. Wellman gave it as his opinion that "race played a very im-
portant factor in the decision to deny Professor Elsayed ten-
ure."127 
Dr. Wellman's application of his eight decoding criteria to 
the tenure decision is set forth in the opinion as follows: 
a. The University's justification for denying tenure lacked 
"credence"; 
b. Tenure criteria were applied inconsistently; 
c. Inconsistent tenure criteria advantaged whites and dis-
advantaged blacks; 
d. Tenure criteria shifted when challenged; 
e. Statistical evidence showed disparate treatment; 
f. Procedural violations occurred in the tenure process; 
g. University officials trivialized and dismissed Elsayed's 
qualifications and accomplishments; and 
h. University officials failed to follow procedures for reduc-
ing racial inequality.128 
Anyone versed in the McDonnell Douglas jurisprudence 
will likely be struck by the seeming familiarity of Dr. 
Wellman's criteria. Comparative treatment of blacks and 
whites, including statistical evidence, grounds for the tenure 
decision that shift under challenge, procedural irregularities in 
the tenure process - such evidence goes to the classic "pretext" 
123 Id. 
124 Id. at 48. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. at 55. 
128 Elsayed, 299 F.3d at 1062. 
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analysis under McDonnell Douglas.129 Even some of the par-
ticular terms Dr. Wellman uses - lack of credence, disparate 
treatment - are salient as terms of art in Title VII jurispru-
dence. "Proof that the defendant's explanation is unworthy of 
credence is simply one form of circumstantial evidence that is 
probative of intentional discrimination," said the Reeves court, 
explaining the reasoning from pretext under the McDonnell 
Douglas regime, "and it may be quite persuasive."130 As a soci-
ology professor studying racial discrimination since the seven-
ties,l3l Dr. Wellman has very likely been influenced by the sig-
nificant Title VII legal opinions and the writing of legal schol-
ars, adopting and adapting legal evidence-processing schemes 
to his own purposes. 
This mirroring between Title VII jurisprudence and Dr. 
Wellman's methodology creates some curious difficulties in the 
courtroom under the Daubert regime and the Federal Rules 
governing admissibility of expert testimony. Issues arise under 
both the relevance and the reliability prongs of the Daubert 
doctrine, and the court's skepticism toward the enterprise of 
drawing the inference of discrimination from circumstantial 
evidence, implicit in its harmless error determination, ulti-
mately implicates Dr. Wellman's testimony along with all the 
other evidence in the case. 
2. The Methodology Encounters the Rules 
a. The Relevance Requirement under Evidence Rule 702 and 
Daubert 
Expert opinion evidence is admissible under Rule 702 if it 
will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or de-
termine a fact in issue.132 This helpfulness requirement, en-
compassed in the Daubert relevance determination, is the cen-
tral concern of Rule 702, according to the Elsayed court.133 Not-
ing that the relevance issue was not properly before it, as de-
fendants conceded in oral argument that Dr. Wellman's testi-
129 McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804. See Selmi, supra note 11, at 666-668 
(applying McDonnell Douglas pretext analysis to the case of a black law professor). 
130 Reeves, 530 U.S. at 147. 
131 Appellee's Brief at 44. 
132 Fed. Rule Evid. 702 (2000). 
133 Elsayed, 299 F.3d at 1063 n.7. 
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mony was "absolutely" relevant,l34 the court nevertheless care-
fully bracketed the issue in two substantive footnotes citing 
extensive authority.13s 
If the case is retried, this issue may well be resurrected. 
The defendants pressed the point vigorously in their appellate 
brief, despite having apparently conceded the issue at trial.136 
The plaintiff took the position that Dr. Wellman's testimony 
helped the jury in analyzing "coded expressions of contempo-
rary racism."137 Ferreting out subtle discrimination, however, 
is essentially what the McDonnell Douglas proof regime is de-
signed to do, and the pretext analysis under Title VII is no less 
applicable to contemporary racism than it was to the facts of 
Percy Green's case in McDonnell Douglas. 13s The jury in this 
case did in fact receive jury instructions based on pretext 
analysis.139 Since Dr. Wellman's decoding method significantly 
resembles McDonnell Douglas pretext analysis, the question 
arises whether Wellman's application of his method to the evi-
dence in the case was not simply redundant in the courtroom 
and thus not helpful to the trier of fact. 
b. The Reliability Requirement under Evidence Rule 702 and 
Daubert 
The reliability analysis produces even more vexed results 
than the relevance inquiry. What emerges is that, in order to 
pass the as-applied reliability test under Rule 702 and the 
Daubert regime, Dr. Wellman's testimony must come perilously 
close to violating the rule against drawing legal conclusions for 
the jury. 
134 [d. (quoting Defendants). 
135 [d. at 1063 n.7, 1066 n.9. 
136 Appellant's Opening Brief at 41-43, Elsayed Mukhtar v. California State Uni-
versity, Hayward, 299 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2002), amended, 319 F.3d 1073 (9 th Cir. 2003) 
(No. 01-15565). 
137 Elsayed, 299 F.3d at 1066 n. 9. 
138 See Selmi, supra note 11, at 290. 
139 Appellants' Opening Brief at 43. 
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i. Admissibility of ultimate issue testimony: Under the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence, testimony in the form of an opinion or 
inference is not inadmissible because it embraces an ultimate 
issue of fact.140 An ultimate issue of law, however, is another 
matter; an expert witness may not give an opinion as to a legal 
conclusion.141 Here, in the context of ruling against the plaintiff 
on the standard for review, the court stated that the trial court 
clearly admitted Dr. Wellman's testimony subject to this prohi-
bition against legal conclusions, and also that Wellman stayed 
within the permitted parameters with his testimony.142 Subse-
quently, however, the court exposed the uncertainty underlying 
the trial court's decision to admit the testimony, quoting the 
trial court's analysis in full: 
Well, I see Wellman and [CSUH's expert witnesses on EI-
sayed's academic qualifications] as essentially parallel, and I 
would prefer that none of them express their own opinion 
about whether this decision was right or wrong. But if any of 
them are going to, then I guess all of them have to. And since 
both sides have prepared on the basis that they all will, I sup-
pose you would prefer that I let all of them do it, rather than 
downplay as much as possible any of them substituting their 
judgment for what the jury ultimately has to find, which is 
whether, in fact, this decision was based on race discrimina-
tion or based on legitimate academic concerns. They each 
have their own opinion, which is essentially what the jury will 
have to decide, so I don't exactly know how we're going to 
avoid having each of them go through all of the evidence and 
essentially deliberate as jurors and argue about which - what 
means what and what factor goes which way. It's not really 
appropriate, so I guess we'll just have to try to keep it as brief 
as possible, in Dr. Wellman's case, on general factors that 
would lead to such decisions, and likewise in [CSUH expert's] 
case, on general factors that would lead to such decisions, as 
opposed to their trying to convince the jury of their own view 
14. Fed. Rule Evid. 704(a) (1984). 
141 McHugh v. United Servo Auto. Ass'n., 164 F.3d 451, 454 (9th Cir. 1999). 
142 Elsayed, 299 F.3d at 1063. At issue here was whether defendants' motion in 
limine was sufficient to preserve their objection to Dr. Wellman's testimony, making 
contemporaneous objection unnecessary and thus warranting review under the abuse 
of discretion standard rather than for plain error. [d. 
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of what the truth is of what the underlying state of mind was. 
So that's about all the guidance I can give on that. 143 
59 
The court quoted this passage ostensibly to establish that 
the lower court made no reliability determination. 144 What is 
most evident, though, is the difficulty the trial judge had in 
locating the line between ultimate issue of fact and legal con-
clusion in the type of testimony being proffered.145 
In the event, Dr. Wellman did not hew to "general factors 
that would lead to such decisions"; rather, he applied his eight 
criteria for decoding white behavior to the particular facts of 
the university's tenure decision in Dr. Elsayed's case. 146 Since 
Dr. Wellman's decoding criteria do the same kind of work as 
the McDonnell Douglas proof regime, under which discrimina-
tion is established by exposing an employer's justification for 
an adverse action as pretext, Wellman surely came close to 
reaching a legal conclusion when he applied his criteria. It is 
not hard to understand the uncertainty expressed in the lower 
court's analysis of the defendants' exclusion motion. Indeed, 
the Ninth Circuit opinion itself seems internally inconsistent 
on this point: in deciding an initial matter, the court held that 
Wellman's testimony stayed on the right side of the ultimate 
facti legal conclusion boundary,147 and yet ultimately the court 
concluded that "Dr. Wellman drew the inference of discrimina-
tion for the jury. "148 
Perhaps the key to the difficulty here is that there are no 
elements to an employment discrimination cause of action un-
der McDonnell Douglas. 149 Legal scholar John Valery White 
posits that the McDonnell Douglas court deliberately created 
an empty structure, purposefully avoiding any definition of ei-
ther discrimination or the protected categories under Title VII, 
1<" Elsayed, 299 F.3d at 1064-1065. I have not included the entire passage quoted 
by the Court . 
... Id. at 1065 . 
• 45 The academic experts' testimony was apparently not contested and is not me-
morialized in the opinion. It might have made a useful point of comparison . 
• 48 Elsayed, 299 F.3d at 1062 . 
• <7 Id. at 1063. See supra note 128 . 
• 48 Id. at 1068 . 
• 49 John Valery White, The Irrational Turn in Employment Discrimination Law: 
Slouching Toward a Unified Approach to Civil Rights Law. 53 MERCER L.REV. 709, 797 
(2002). 
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so that the law could accommodate the many forms of both.l50 
Instead of a cause of action with elements, there is an evidence-
ordering device. This blurs the line between issues of fact and 
issues of law. "For better or for worse, the Court in McDonnell 
Douglas seemed to want the fact-finder to be king, transform-
ing all questions into at least mixed questions of law and 
fact."l5l Thus, in drawing the inference of discrimination, Dr. 
Wellman was truly taking away the jury's work, leaving noth-
ing further for the factfinder to do. 
ii. Kumho's Catch-22: If Dr. Wellman's testimony did cross 
the line between ultimate fact issue and legal conclusion, could 
he have avoided this by sticking to "general factors," as the 
trial court suggested in giving guidance on the issue?l52 The 
2000 amendments to Evidence Rule 702 specify that, in addi-
tion to sufficient facts or data and reliable principles and meth-
ods, the admissibility of expert testimony depends on the reli-
able application of the witness's principles and methods to the 
facts of the case.l53 In Kumho Tire, which centered on the reli-
ability of a tire-failure analyst's testimony, the Court made 
clear that the reasonableness of the expert's method in general 
would not suffice to establish the admissibility of his testi-
mony.l54 For the testimony to be admissible under Daubert and 
the evidence rules, what had to be established was the reason-
ableness of the expert's particular method of gathering and 
analyzing data in order to reach a conclusion on the particular 
matter to which his testimony was relevant. l55 "The relevant 
issue was whether the expert could reliably determine the 
cause of this tire's separation."l56 
150 [d. at 720. 
151 [d. 
152 Elsayed, 299 F.3d at 1065. 
153 Fed. Rule of Evid. 702 (2000). Note that the case was tried in September 2000, 
before these amendments became effective. See Fed. Rule of Evid. 702, 28 U.S.C.A; 
Appellee's Brief at 30. However, Kumho, a 1999 decision, imposes this requirement, 
and the amendments apparently represent an incorporation of existing law rather than 
a departure from it. See Reliable Evaluation of Expert Testimony, 116 HARv. L. REV. 
2142, 2144 (2003). 
1M Kumho, 526 U.S. at 153-154. 
155 [d. at 154. 
156 [d. Emphasis in original. 
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Thus, on the one hand, Dr. Wellman's testimony was in 
danger of impinging on the jury's province and reaching a legal 
conclusion if it didn't limit itself to general factors157 -- but on 
the other hand, the testimony was apparently in danger of be-
ing found unreliable if it didn't go beyond general factors to 
determine the cause of this particular adverse employment ac-
tion. The Elsayed court makes clear that the reliability deter-
mination the trial court failed to make was not a matter of Dr. 
Wellman's qualifications. 158 "[T]he issue left unresolved at trial 
was whether his research and opinions were sufficiently reli-
able so that the trial judge would permit him to apply his theo-
ries to the facts and tell the jury that Dr. Rees' decision must 
have been racially motivated."159 If Dr. Rees' decision was ra-
cially motivated, then she has unlawfully discriminated 
against Dr. Elsayed under Title VII. To pass the as-applied 
reliability test under Kumho, Dr. Wellman needed to draw the 
inference for the jury, usurping its function as factfinder. 
When the Kumho expert drew the inference of defect, he testi-
fied to an ultimate fact, in order to establish an element of the 
products liability cause of action. But in an intentional dis-
crimination action under Title VII, there are no elements and 
there is only one ultimate fact, the fact of discrimination itself. 
3. Drawing the Inference from Circumstantial Evidence 
Both Dr. Wellman's decoding methodology and the stan-
dard pretext analysis under McDonnell Douglas proceed by 
drawing the inference of discrimination from circumstantial 
evidence.16o Delivering its harmless error determination, the 
Elsayed court characterizes the evidence in the case, aside from 
Wellman's testimony, as "less-than-convincing circumstantial 
evidence. "161 This raises the question - a constant theme in 
Title VII jurisprudence and the legal scholarship - of what it 
takes for circumstantial evidence to be convincing where dis-
crimination is concerned. 
157 Elsayed, 299 F.3d at 1065. 
1M Id at 1066 n.ll. "Indeed, his curriculum vitae is quite impressive," says the 
court.ld. 
159 Elsayed as amended, 319 F.3d at 1074. 
160 Appellee's Brief at 48; McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-804. 
161 Elsayed, 299 F.3d at 1068. 
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Michael Selmi points out that the McDonnell Douglas 
proof model is essentially binary: "Within the framework de-
veloped by the Court in McDonnell Douglas and its progeny, 
once an employer articulates the reason for its decision, the 
legal battle becomes one between discrimination, on the one 
hand, and the employer's asserted rationale on the other."162 
The first stage of the proof regime - the prima facie case -
achieves this binary construct by introducing race into the 
process as a possible explanation for the employment decision 
and eliminating the two most likely alternative explanations, 
that there was no job available or that the candidate was un-
qualified. 163 In conducting the discrimination inquiry under 
this construct, a court is not concerned with the real reason for 
the contested action in an absolute sense, but rather with 
whether discrimination can be established under the standard 
of proof for a civillawsuit.164 
Kumho once more provides an instructive comparison. 
Kumho turned on the reliability of expert testimony based on 
circumstantial evidence, but in the products liability context.16S 
Where there was no direct evidence of a defect in the tire that 
caused the plaintiffs' accident, a tire failure expert, using his 
own method of visual and tactile inspection, drew the inference 
of defect in the absence of at least two of a set list of four tire 
abuse symptoms he had developed. 166 Like the McDonnell 
Douglas pretext analysis, the tire expert's method sets up a 
binary proposition initially: under the Kumho construct, if not 
abuse, then defect; under the McDonnell Douglas construct, if 
not the employer's proffered justification, then discrimination. 
Both are essentially presumption-driven. If abuse is disproved, 
then defect stands; if employer justification is disproved, then 
discrimination stands. "A prima facie case .. , raises an infer-
ence of discrimination only because we presume these acts, if 
162 See Selmi, supra note 11, at 326. 
163 [d. at 324-325. 
164 [d. at 327. 
165 See Kumho, 526 U.S. at 153-154. 
166 [d. at 144, 154. "Nor was the basis for Carlson's conclusion simply the general 
theory that, in the absence of evidence of abuse, a defect will normally have caused a 
tire's separation. Rather, the expert employed a more specific theory to establish the 
existence (or absence) of such abuse. Carlson testified precisely that in the absence of 
at least two of four signs of abuse ... he concludes that a defect caused the separation." 
[d. at 154. 
26
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 1 [2004], Art. 4
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol34/iss1/4
2004] DISCRIMINATION IN THE WORKPLACE 63 
otherwise unexplained, are more likely than not based on the 
consideration of impermissible factors."167 
The limitation of the analogy, and the point of the com-
parison, lies in the crucial difference between the founding pre-
sumptions of these two interpretive devices. Whereas the pre-
sumption of defect in tire-failure analysis is quite innocuous, 
merely a matter of empirical plausibility, the discrimination 
presumption in the legal analysis of employment decisions is 
highly charged, a matter of our continuing relationship to and 
experience of our own history of racial oppression. According to 
Selmi, this presumption is essential to the McDonnell Douglas 
regime: "[T]he entire McDonnell Douglas proof structure was 
premised on a belief in the power of discrimination as an ex-
planatory variable - a belief that is central to the Court's entire 
antidiscrimination doctrine."I68 Clearly, it is not circumstantial 
evidence per se that is the problem. Insofar as the use of cir-
cumstantial evidence seems unobjectionable and common-
sensical in the Kumho products liability context - but suspect 
and difficult in the discrimination context - perhaps this is be-
cause, as Selmi suggests, the presumption of discrimination 
has lost its explanatory power.169 
This is where Dr. Wellman's testimony comes in. 
Wellman's testimony can be seen as an attempt to resettle pre-
text analysis - of which his decoding methodology can now be 
seen as a variant - on a new empirical foundation supplied by 
his ethnographic studies of the racial attitudes of white Ameri-
cans. To make the preliminary presumption of discrimination 
more persuasive, Dr. Wellman would substitute explicit socio-
logical information for the implicit historical consciousness un-
derlying Title VII pretext analysis. 
Can such a project ultimately succeed in the courtroom, 
assuming subtle discrimination testimony can gain admission 
under the relevance and reliability requirements? The answer 
to this question is, of course, purely speculative. That beliefs 
can be impervious to information, however, is well known. 
Here, the jury clearly saw something different from what the 
appeals court saw, having made an award of damages that sug-
167 Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978). 
168 Selmi, supra note 11, at 328. 
169 [d. at 283-284. 
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gests they saw more than what Dr. Wellman showed them.170 
The court, on the other hand, was not persuaded. l71 The court -
- at best carelessly and at worst disingenuously -- set Dr. 
Wellman's testimony over against the rest of the evidence in 
the case and dismissed this artificial remainder as less-than-
convincing circumstantial evidence. What you believe is 
largely what you see - or, as Michael Selmi has said, it's a mat-
ter of perspective: "[T]he difficulty of proving subtle discrimina-
tion does not stem principally from its unconscious nature, but 
rather from the gap in perspectives that exists between African 
Americans and whites over the continued relevance of dis-
crimination."172 Something like this gap, as Selmi also points 
out, has stubbornly and persistently divided legal academics 
from the courts in individual employment discrimination cases 
under Title VII.173 
C. SUBSTITUTING THE MIXED-MoTIVES REGIME UNDER COSTA 
FOR THE PRETEXT REGIME UNDER REEVES 
The actual deployment of the Title VII proof structure is 
almost perfunctory in Elsayed, taking up just one paragraph 
toward the end of the opinion. "To establish racial discrimina-
tion in the employment context, Elsayed must demonstrate 
that the reason CSUH gave for denying Elsayed tenure - lack 
of scholarly achievement - is a mere pretext for illegal racial 
discrimination."174 Since we've heard this before, or something 
170 See Erin Texeira, The Subtle Clues to Racism A white sociologist's nine [sic] 
criteria for spotting veiled bias become key to a lawsuit over tenure. Hanging in the 
balance is a black professor's career. Los ANGELES TIMES, January 11, 2001. This 
news-feature account of Dr. Wellman's testimony and the jurors' reactions is truly 
intriguing - and utterly inconclusive. According to the report, the jury foreman, Daniel 
Coppock, said Dr. Wellman was "probably the best witness on either side. He gelled 
the case for everyone." [d. Coppock said further that Wellman's "theories of hidden 
racism" didn't work until he applied them to himself, reflecting on the times he'd feared 
a black man on the street, despite his tolerant upbringing. [d. But Coppock then went 
on to say he thought the university administrators were biased against Professor El-
sayed not because he is black but because he conducts research on militant Muslim 
communities - religious politics. [d. Other jurors reported feeling the university ad-
ministrators came across in their testimony as smug, sure of victory - and the defen-
dants' lawyer said she felt the jurors had found Elsayed "more personable" than her 
clients. [d. 
171 "We are not persuaded." Elsayed, 299 F.3d at 1067. 
172 Selmi, supra note 11, at 663. 
173 [d. at 659-660. 
174 Elsayed, 299 F.3d at 1067. 
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very like it, in the preceding consideration of Wellman's "decod-
ing" testimony, the actual Title VII rhetoric seems merely an 
attenuated echo. But when the opinion was amended in Feb-
ruary of 2003, a very suggestive substitution occurred in this 
paragraph: "To establish racial discrimination in the employ-
ment context, Elsayed must demonstrate that CSUH denied 
him tenure 'because of his race. While race need not be the sole 
factor in CSUH's decision, it must be a 'motivating factor.'"175 
At this juncture, the Costa v. Desert Palace mixed-motive case 
is substituted for the Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing pretext 
case as the authority supplied by the court under Title VII.176 
The opinion in Costa v. Desert Palace, a gender discrimina-
tion case, was filed in the Ninth Circuit just five days before 
Elsayed. 177 Like Professor Elsayed, plaintiff Catharina Costa 
won a jury verdict; unlike Elsayed, Costa prevailed on appeal. 
The U.S. Supreme Court, Justice Thomas writing, unani-
mously affirmed the judgment in Costa's favor in June of 
2003.178 This decision has generally been greeted with qualified 
excitement by the plaintiffs' employment discrimination bar 
and with some consternation by employers' attorneys.179 In De-
sert Palace, the Court settled a long-running debate among the 
circuits, finding that a plaintiff need not present direct evi-
dence of discrimination in order to prevail in a "mixed-motive" 
employment discrimination case under Title VII.180 All that is 
required is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude, 
by a preponderance of the evidence, that race, color, religion, 
sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any adverse 
action by an employer. lSI 
175 Elsayed as amended, 319 F.3d at 1074 (citing Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299 
F.3d 838 - slip op. at 10993 (9th Cir. 2002». 
176 Elsayed, 299 F.3d at 1067; Elsayed as amended, 319 F.3d at 1074. 
177 Costa v. Desert Palace, 299 F.3d 838 (9th Cir. 2002). 
178 Desert Palace v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 96 (2003). 
179 See Mark Spognardi, Supreme Court Opens Gates to Plaintiff "Mixed·Motive" 
Employment Discrimination Lawsuits, EMPLOYMENT, LABOR AND BENEFITS 
NEWSLETTER, 13:3 (September 2003) at 
http://www.hkiaw.comJPublications/Newsletter.asp? ID=394& Artlcle=2270; Shannon 
P. Duffy, High Court Paves Easier Road to Jury for Discrimination Plaintiffs, THE 
LEGAL INTELLIGENCER (June 11, 2003) at 
http://www.law.comljsp/article.jsp?id=10524408674001 
lao Desert Palace v. Costa, 539 U.S. at 90. 
181 Id. at 94-95. 
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This short, unanimous opinion, clearly reasoned and 
plainly written, seems like a sudden release into straightfor-
wardness and good sense after all the convolutions of the 
thirty-year-old Title VII employment discrimination jurispru-
dence. In the abstract and intuitively, it would seem easier to 
show that race or gender, for example, was one motivating fac-
tor among others than to establish that it was the one true rea-
son masquerading behind a pretextual justification for an em-
ployment action. Thus, it is tempting to speculate that mixed-
motive cases will become the preferred vehicle for plaintiffs 
alleging employment discrimination, now that the artificial 
hobble of the direct evidence requirement has been removed. 
Indeed, this was a prospect that worried the Ninth Circuit dis-
senters: 
[A]part from our duty to abide by precedent, policy concerns 
favor adhering to Justice O'Connor's view of mixed motives 
analysis. ... To keep the mixed motive framework from over-
riding in all cases the McDonnell Douglas rule and the pre-
text requirement, which it clearly was not meant to do, mixed 
motive analysis properly is available only in a special subset 
of cases. Justice O'Connor's direct evidence requirement 
meets this need: It requires the plaintiff to produce highly 
probative, direct evidence before she may utilize the more le-
nient, mixed motives test. As a practical matter, without this 
or some similar constraint on when a plaintiff may invoke the 
mixed motives test, any plaintiff would opt for the Hopkins 
framework to avoid having to show pretext.182 
This language is striking for its ruthless practicality: 
"without this or some other similar constraint" suggests that 
the content of the constraint is a matter of relative indifference, 
so long as whatever it is truly works to keep the mixed-motives 
framework from overrunning the McDonnell Douglas regime 
and, by implication, the employment discrimination plaintiffs 
from flooding into the courtS.183 If the dissenters are right 
182 Costa v. Desert Palace, 299 F.3d 838 at 867. (Gould, J., dissenting). 
183 Counterbalancing the perceived lenience of the mixed motives regime is an 
affirmative defense affecting the remedies available to mixed-motive plaintiffs. See 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(i}-(ii) (2000). Under what is sometimes called the "same 
decision" defense, an employer who can show that it would have reached the same 
decision even without the impermissible motivation can avoid all but equitable reme-
dies. [d. See also Kelly Pierce, Comment. A Fire Without Smoke: The Elimination of the 
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about the relative attractions of the mixed-motive and pretext 
regimes, then the apparent casualness with which the Elsayed 
court substitutes Costa v. Desert Palace for Reeves in amending 
its opinion suggests that plaintiffs will have little trouble re-
tooling pretext cases as mixed-motive cases. 
However, this apparent easing of the way for employment 
discrimination plaintiffs may prove deceptive. It is difficult to 
see, for example, how Professor Elsayed will be any better off in 
the retrial of his case under Desert Palace than he would have 
been under Reeves. Though he can now prevail without show-
ing his race was the real reason for the tenure decision against 
him, he will nevertheless need to demonstrate that his race 
was a motivating factor, and the causal link may prove just as 
difficult to establish as pretext.1S4 He will still need to rely on 
circumstantial evidence to make his case, and presumably 
without the aid of the McDonnell Douglas device for framing 
the question and ordering the evidence. Deficient scholarship 
was the reason the University offered for its tenure denial, and 
Professor Elsayed argued this reason was pretextual. It is far 
from clear that he would have an easier time proving his race 
played a motivating part in the tenure decision though his 
scholarship was deficient, even if he would be willing to con-
cede as much. In McDonnell Douglas, where the company's 
proffered reason for refusing to rehire Percy Green was his 
"unlawful, disruptive acts" against it, would Green have been 
better off arguing on remand that his race played a motivating 
part than that the employer's concern was pretextual? As ap-
plied to facts of cases, pretext and mixed-motive analysis often 
come out about the same.1S5 
Direct Evidence Requirement for Mixed-Motive Employment Discrimination Cases in 
Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc. 87 MINN. L. REV. 2173, 2198 (2003). 
184 Causation in mixed motive cases bristles with its own interpretive difficulties, 
as anyone who has ever tried actually to read the famously fractured Price Waterlwuse 
opinion will attest. See Susan Bisom-Rapp, Of Motives and Maleness: A Critical View 
of Mixed Motive Doctrine in Title VII Sex Discrimination Cases, 1995 UTAH L. REV. 
1029 (1995) (demonstrating the difficulties entailed in analyzing the facts of particular 
cases under a mixed motive regime). 
185 "It is ... possible to say that all cases are mixed motive ones: even McDonnell-
Burdine cases are predicated on the existence of discriminatory motivations, and the 
employer's articulation of a nondiscrimintory reason does not negate the possibility 
that discrimination motivated the decision. It merely offers an alternative motivation 
that may (or may not) be more plausible than the inference of discrimination." Charles 
Sullivan, Accounting for Price Waterhouse: Proving Disparate Treatment Under Title 
VII, 56 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1107, 1162 (1991). 
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When Dr. Wellman gave his opinion in Elsayed, drawing 
the inference of discrimination for the jury, he actually phrased 
his conclusion in mixed-motive language rather than pretext 
language: "[R]ace played a very important factor in the decision 
to deny Professor Elsayed tenure."186 If, as this suggests, Dr. 
Wellman would be comfortable applying his decoding method-
ology in a mixed-motive context, the question arises whether 
his testimony would fare better with the court on retrial under 
a mixed-motive regime. More generally, will the mixed-motive 
context prove friendlier to subtle discrimination testimony than 
the pretext context has shown itself to be in Elsayed? 
No expert testimony was offered in Desert Palace itself. In 
Price Waterhouse, however, which was the seminal mixed-
motive case, psychology professor Dr. Susan Fiske testified as 
an expert on sex stereotyping. 187 The admissibility of her tes-
timony was not at issue, as the defendants did not object to it. 
Still, it is possible to infer from the opinion that the testimony 
might have had trouble passing muster if it had been at issue. 
Justice Brennan, writing for the plurality, seemed to question 
the relevance of Dr. Fiske's testimony, though benignly dis-
posed toward it. Brennan was "tempted," as he said, to say 
that Dr. Fiske's testimony was "merely icing on [plaintiff] Hop-
kins' cake," since "[i]t takes no special training to discern sex 
stereotyping in a description of an aggressive female employee 
as requiring 'a course in charm school.'"188 Justice Kennedy, 
dissenting, patently found Fiske's testimony unreliable: "The 
plaintiff who engages the services of Dr. Susan Fiske should 
have no trouble showing that sex discrimination played a part 
in any decision. "189 
Nevertheless, it seems clear that in a mixed-motive con-
text, testimony such as Dr. Fiske's, which focused on the writ-
ten statements of decision-makers and drew only the inference 
of sexism, would not necessarily trigger the Kumho Catch-22 
discussed above.190 That is, unlike Dr. Wellman in Elsayed, Dr. 
Fiske in Price Waterhouse could satisfy the as-applied reliabil-
186 Appellee's Brief at 55. Defendants note that Dr. Wellman "misstated this legal 
principle." Appellants' Opening Brief at 44. 
187 Charles Sullivan, Accounting for Price Waterhouse: Proving Disparate Treat-
ment Under Title VII. 56 BROOKLYN L. REv. 1107, 1148 (1991). 
188 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 256. 
189 Id. at 294 n.5. 
190 See supra notes 152-159 and accompanying text. 
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ity test under Kumho, applying her method to particular facts 
of the case, without triggering the rule against offering legal 
conclusions to the jury.191 This is because the causal link re-
mains to be drawn between the sexism present in the em-
ployer's statements and the actual decision in the adverse em-
ployment action at issue. The Price Waterhouse court showed 
how the causal inference could be drawn: 
Hopkins showed that the partnership solicited evaluations 
from all of the firm's partners; that it generally relied very 
heavily on such evaluations in making its decision; that some 
of the partners' comments were the product of stereotyping; 
and that the firm in no way disclaimed reliance on these par-
ticular comments, either in Hopkins' case or in the past. Cer-
tainly a plausible ... conclusion to draw from this set of cir-
cumstances is that the Policy Board in making its decision did 
in fact take into account all of the partners' comments, includ-
ing the comments that were motivated by stereotypical no-
tions about women's proper deportment.192 
Though the difference may at first seem simply to be a dif-
ference between Dr. Fiske's methodology and Dr. Wellman's 
methodology, a more fundamental difference can be located in 
the departure of the mixed-motive regime from the traditional 
McDonnell Douglas pretext regime. Discussing Miles u. M.N.C. 
Corp., a precursor to the Price Waterhouse case, legal scholar 
Charles Sullivan analyzes the way the mixed-motive cases 
came to branch off from the McDonnell Douglas regime.193 In 
Miles, there was "direct evidence" of discriminatory intent 
where a manager said the company did not hire blacks because 
"half of them weren't worth a shit."194 In cases like Miles, ex-
plains Sullivan, where intent is first found by direct evidence, 
it becomes important to establish the causal link between dis-
criminatory intent and the plaintiff's injury.195 These cases be-
came known as "mixed motive" cases "because the issue was 
whether permissible or impermissible motives 'caused' the de-
191 Note that Price Waterlwuse was decided ten years before Kumlw. See Price 
Waterlwuse, 490 U.S. at 228; Kumlw, 526 U.S. at 137. 
192 Price Waterlwuse, 490 U.S. at 1794. 
193 Sullivan, supra note 187, at 1118. 
194 Miles v. M.N.C. Corp., 750 F.2d 867, 874 (11 th Cir. 1985). 
196 Sullivan, supra note 187, at 1118. 
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cision at issue."196 In McDonnell Douglas, on the other hand, 
where employer conduct is the basis of the inference of dis-
crimination, the question of causation is "subsumed" in the 
question of whether to draw the inference.197 
As Sullivan's analysis suggests, mixed-motive cases have 
tended to feature incriminating statements by the employer.198 
Such statements can be decoded, if decoding is required, with-
out reaching the ultimate legal conclusion of discrimination. 
Where the inference of discrimination is drawn from the em-
ployer's conduct, as in Elsayed, it will prove much more diffi-
cult to perform the decoding without offering a legal conclusion. 
Thus, even though Desert Palace has withdrawn the direct-
evidence requirement imposed by the courts under Price 
Waterhouse, permitting cases like Elsayed to be framed as 
mixed-motive cases, subtle discrimination testimony based on 
employer conduct will still have trouble passing muster under 
the expert testimony rules without triggering the legal conclu-
sion prohibition. 
D. THE REHABILITATION OF CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE IN 
DESERT PALACE 
In lifting the direct-evidence requirement for mixed-motive 
Title VII employment discrimination cases, Desert Palace de-
196 Id. 
197Id. 
198 According to Kelly Pierce, most courts determine whether a case will proceed 
as a mixed-motive case or as pretext case based on whether the plaintiff can produce 
direct evidence. Kelly Pierce, Comment. A Fire Without Smoke: The Elimination of the 
Direct Evidence Requirement for Mixed-Motive Employment Discrimination Cases in 
Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc. 87 MINN. L. REV. 2173, 2185-2186 (2003). However, Pierce 
points out that the circuits are thoroughly split on a definition of direct evidence. Id. at 
2186. Charles Sullivan declares "direct evidence" a "misnomer," pointing out that even 
in Miles, an inference must be drawn to find that the employer's obvious animus moti-
vated the employment decision. Sullivan, supra note 187, at 1119. In a general way, 
though, it is safe to say that "direct evidence" is used to characterize statements rather 
than conduct: "IT]estimony of employers or their admissions are analyzed under Price 
Waterhouse; inferences of bad thoughts drawn from conduct are treated under McDon-
nell Douglas and Burdine. Where admissions are concerned, the plaintiff must con-
vince the fact-finder that bad thoughts not only existed but also influenced the decision 
maker. To the extent that the plaintiffs proof rests on inferences drawn from the em-
ployer's conduct, however, all three stages collapse into one: does the conduct which, by 
definition, affects the plaintiff, reveal the existence of prohibited considerations?" Id. 
at 1157. 
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livered a short lesson concerning the use of circumstantial evi-
dence in discrimination cases generally: 
We have often acknowledged the utility of circumstantial evi-
dence in discrimination cases. For instance, in Reeves v. 
Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc. [citation omitted], we rec-
ognized that evidence that a defendant's explanation for an 
employment practice is 'unworthy of credence' is 'one form of 
circumstantial evidence that is probative of intentional dis-
crimination.' [citation omitted]. The reason for treating cir-
cumstantial and direct evidence alike is both clear and deep-
rooted: 'Circumstantial evidence is not only sufficient, but 
may also be more certain, satisfying and persuasive than di-
rect evidence."199 
The Court went on to point out that circumstantial evi-
dence has always been considered sufficient in court, even in 
criminal cases, where proof beyond a reasonable doubt is re-
quired.20o It is not surprising, then, said the Court, that neither 
the employer in this case nor its amici curiae can point to any 
other circumstance in which the Court has required a showing 
of direct evidence without an affirmative statutory directive.201 
It is worth speculating about why and how such a mystifi-
cation has uniquely grown up around and enshrouded dis-
crimination jurisprudence. As suggested above, one reason for 
the unwillingness to draw inferences from circumstantial evi-
dence in employment discrimination cases may be a growing 
reluctance to embrace the explanatory presumption of dis-
crimination on which the McDonnell Douglas regime is 
founded.202 If this is so, then the brisk demystifying language of 
the Desert Palace dictum concerning circumstantial evidence 
may prove to be limited to its rhetorical effect. 
199 Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 94. 
200 [d. at 95. 
201 [d. 
202 Selmi, supra note 11, at 328. 
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III. CONCLUSION 
In Elsayed Mukhtar v. California State University Hay-
ward, the experiment of introducing sociological "subtle dis-
crimination" research into the courtroom has yielded ambigu-
ous results. Under the two-prong Daubert test for expert tes-
timony, questions were raised both about the relevance and 
about the reliability of Dr. Wellman's testimony that the court 
declined to address directly, ostensibly wishing to leave to the 
trial court the issue of admissibility proper. Nor is it clear how 
much of the difficulty encountered in this case had to do with 
the specific structure of Wellman's methodology, his decoding 
device. Given the unusual character of employment discrimi-
nation under McDonnell Douglas as a cause of action without 
elements, it seems desirable not to have a racial-discrimination 
expert draw the inference of discrimination for the jury. And 
yet, in the post-Kumho world - where it is necessary for an ex-
pert to demonstrate not only why tires fail but also why this 
particular tire failed - it is difficult to see how this trap can be 
avoided. 
The Supreme Court decision in Desert Palace arose out of a 
Ninth Circuit case, virtually contemporaneous with Elsayed, 
which was introduced into the Elsayed opinion by amendment. 
Desert Palace has aroused a good deal of speculation as to 
whether the McDonnell Douglas pretext regime is simply obso-
lete and due to expire.203 Of course, it is much too early to tell 
whether, in fact, the mixed-motive analysis will come to dis-
place pretext analysis, now that the direct evidence hobble has 
been removed. For Professor Elsayed, as argued above, it cer-
tainly is not clear that the mixed-motives route would provide 
an advantage over the pretext route. 
In her influential 1995 article, Professor Malamud called 
for an end to the McDonnell Douglas regime in the name of 
"intellectual honesty" and for the sake of encouraging "a more 
subtle and creative understanding of discrimination in its 
many forms.''204 She noted, however, that to abandon McDon-
nell Douglas would be to remove a constraint on the appellate 
203 See, e.g., Pierce, supra note 198, at 2207-2209. 
204 Malamud, supra note 7, at 2320. 
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courts, empowering them to "attempt to expand their own role 
by establishing 'rules' about the kinds of evidence that will and 
will not suffice to prove intentional discrimination as a matter 
oflaw."205 Given the way the appellate court performed its role 
in Elsayed, perhaps we are not ready for the greater openness 
Desert Palace seems to promise. For McDonnell Douglas itself 
once promised openness. John Valery White claims that "the 
Court's plan in McDonnell Douglas was to avoid defining both 
discrimination and the protected categories so that the law 
might accommodate the many forms of both, while creating a 
structure within which justice could be administered."206 If this 
characterization is persuasive, then it casts a cautionary light 
back over the convolutions and mystifications of Title VII em-
ployment discrimination jurisprudence.207 If the Elsayed court 
is representative, then we will not do well to invite the federal 
appellate courts to start over again with a clean slate. The 
mystification is not in the doctrine but in the doctrine's keep-
ers. 
DEBORAH DYSON' 
200 [d. at 2323. 
206 White, supra note 149, at 720. 
207 "For better or for worse, the traditional disparate treatment model, relied on 
by the courts for the last thirty years, remains the best model for proving claims of 
discrimination," says Michael Selmi, "though by labeling it the best model I do not 
mean to suggest that it is a perfect model." Selmi, supra note 11, at 666 . 
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